Affordable housing for staff on San Diego school board agenda | KPBS Public Medi

But Declining Enrollment May Make It Work

TL;DR: San Diego Unified plans to build 1,500 affordable housing units for employees on district properties at an estimated cost of $600-$825 million. While direct salary increases would be more efficient, declining enrollment is creating surplus real estate that the district can repurpose rather than sell, potentially making the housing program self-financing through public-private partnerships while addressing California's teacher retention crisis.

BLUF: The San Diego Unified School District is pursuing an unprecedented plan to build 1,500 affordable housing units for employees on district-owned properties, responding to a workforce crisis driven by California's housing costs that have made teacher recruitment and retention nearly impossible. The initiative may leverage surplus properties from enrollment decline, transforming potential budget burden into creative asset repurposing.

District Converts Real Estate Holdings Into Employee Housing

The San Diego Unified Board of Education convened special meetings January 27-28, 2026, to evaluate developer proposals for constructing affordable workforce housing on four district properties, following December's selection of a developer for a fifth site. The initiative targets employees across all income levels, from custodial staff to teachers, with rental costs capped at 30% of household income.

Board President Richard Barrera emphasized the urgency: "This is such an important strategy to recruit and retain quality employees in one of the most expensive housing markets in the country."

The largest proposed development site is the Eugene Brucker Education Center, the district's University Heights administrative headquarters, where all three competing developers submitted plans for 700 or more units. Additional sites include the Revere Center in Linda Vista, the Fremont/Ballard Center in Old Town, the Instructional Media Center in Birdland, and a vacant 40,000-square-foot Commercial Street property in Logan Heights.

An internal district workforce housing survey documented that most staff members have considered leaving San Diego Unified due to housing costs. The findings underscore California's broader educator retention crisis, where housing affordability has become the primary barrier to maintaining stable teaching staffs.

The Scale and Economics of the Proposal

California multifamily construction costs averaged $400,000-$550,000 per unit in 2025 for affordable housing projects, according to the Terner Center for Housing Innovation at UC Berkeley. Applying these metrics to San Diego Unified's 1,500-unit target yields estimated total development costs of $600-$825 million. San Diego's particularly high land and construction costs could push totals higher.

The district has not disclosed whether it plans to finance construction through municipal bonds, leverage state or federal affordable housing subsidies, partner with developers using Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, retain property ownership, or assume ongoing property management responsibilities. These omissions prevent informed public evaluation and raise questions about fiscal stewardship.

San Diego Unified operated on a $1.83 billion budget for fiscal year 2024-2025, with approximately 85% allocated to salaries and benefits. The district has faced recurring budget deficits and warned of potential program cuts due to declining enrollment and inadequate state funding. The district's existing bond debt from earlier propositions totals approximately $2.6 billion, with annual debt service consuming roughly $150-180 million of the operating budget.

The Fundamental Paradox: Housing vs. Direct Compensation

The initiative raises a basic economic question: If the district cannot afford competitive salaries, how can it finance and manage an $800 million real estate portfolio? And wouldn't direct wage increases better address retention?

The Direct Compensation Alternative:

$750 million invested at 4% yield = $30 million annually
$30 million distributed across 5,000 teachers = $6,000 annual raise per teacher
A targeted $15,000 annual raise for all 5,000 teachers would cost $75 million annually—roughly 4% of the district's operating budget and potentially achievable through state funding advocacy or voter-approved parcel tax measures

Housing Development Approach Comparison:

Estimated cost: $600-825 million (capital)
Serves: 1,500 units (approximately 11% of 13,000 employees)
Ongoing costs: Property management, maintenance, insurance
Complexity: Real estate development, legal compliance, tenant management

For a teacher earning $70,000 annually facing San Diego's median 1-bedroom rent of $2,800 monthly ($33,600 annually), housing consumes 48% of gross income—far exceeding the 30% affordability threshold. The effective subsidy per unit would be approximately $12,600 annually at 30% rent caps.

However, a direct $15,000 salary increase would cost the district $17,850 annually per teacher (including pension contributions), allowing teachers to afford market-rate housing while gaining full wage portability and housing choice—comparable outcomes at potentially lower total cost without real estate management complexity.

California's Housing Crisis Squeezes Public Sector Workers

San Diego County's median home price reached $905,000 in late 2025, while median household rent exceeded $2,800 monthly. These costs far outpace educator salaries—San Diego Unified's teacher salary schedule shows starting teachers earning approximately $52,000 annually, while experienced teachers with advanced degrees can reach $110,000 after decades of service.

The National Education Association's 2024-2025 Rankings report documented that California teachers' average salary of $95,160 ranked fourth nationally, yet purchasing power analyses showed California educators among the nation's worst-compensated when adjusted for cost of living. The Economic Policy Institute calculated that San Diego teachers would need approximately $130,000 annually to maintain the same standard of living as teachers earning $70,000 in median-cost American cities.

The California Department of Education has documented statewide teacher shortages affecting nearly every district, with housing costs identified as a critical factor. A 2024 Learning Policy Institute study found that 76% of California school districts reported difficulty filling teaching positions, with affordability cited as the top recruitment obstacle in coastal communities.

The Hidden Economics: Declining Enrollment Creates Opportunity

San Diego Unified's housing initiative may represent savvy asset repurposing rather than pure expense. Declining enrollment is forcing school closures and creating surplus properties that the district could either sell at market rates or convert to revenue-generating workforce housing.

San Diego Unified's enrollment dropped from approximately 132,000 students in 2002-2003 to roughly 95,000 in 2024-2025—a 28% decline. The California Department of Finance projects San Diego County's school-age population will remain flat or decline through 2030, while statewide K-12 enrollment has dropped by over 400,000 students since 2014. This creates excess capacity—facilities no longer needed for educational purposes.

School districts in California's coastal markets sit on extraordinarily valuable real estate, often acquired decades ago. San Diego Unified's properties include prime locations where land trades at $200-$400 per square foot. The Eugene Brucker Education Center could command $50-100 million in a market sale; the Logan Heights vacant property sits in a rapidly gentrifying neighborhood; and other sites occupy established neighborhoods with strong housing demand.

The Economic Calculation Shifts:

If land cost equals zero (repurposed surplus property), the comparison becomes:

Housing Development Approach:

Land: $0 (surplus property otherwise idle or sold)
Construction: $600-825M (potentially developer-financed)
Net district outlay: potentially $0-200M depending on financing structure
Ongoing revenue: rental income minus management costs
Employee benefit: 1,500 affordable units

Alternative Property Sale Approach:

Revenue: $100-300M (one-time, possibly restricted to capital use only by Education Code)
Lost opportunity: no ongoing income stream
Lost employee benefit: housing crisis unaddressed
Political cost: community opposition to selling public assets during housing crisis

The Public-Private Partnership Model

Most likely, San Diego Unified is pursuing a ground lease or public-private partnership rather than direct development:

Typical Structure:

District contributes land (surplus property) as equity
Private developer provides construction financing and expertise
Development uses Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) providing ~30% subsidy
Tax-exempt bond financing reduces borrowing costs ~2% below market rates
District negotiates employee preference rights and affordability requirements
Developer manages property; district receives ground lease payments or revenue share
After tax credit compliance period (15-30 years), ownership might revert to district

Example Pro Forma (500-unit site):

Land value contributed by district: $40 million (equity)
Construction cost: $250 million
LIHTC subsidy: $75 million (30%)
Tax-exempt bonds: $175 million (developer responsibility)
Ground lease payments to district: $2-4 million annually
Employee units reserved: 80-100% at <30% income
Net district cost: $0 upfront; ongoing revenue stream

If developers provide construction financing secured by future rental income, the near-term budget impact could be minimal:

Year 1-3 (Development Phase):

District contribution: surplus land + staff time
Possible budget cost: $5-10M for consultants, legal, planning
No major capital outlay if developer-financed

Year 4+ (Operations):

Rental revenue: $30-50M annually (1,500 units × $2,000-2,800/month)
Operating costs: ~$10-15M annually (management, maintenance, debt service)
Net revenue: $15-35M annually or used to subsidize below-market rents
Employee benefit: equivalent to $10,000-15,000 annual raise for participants

This makes the program potentially self-sustaining while delivering substantial employee benefits—vastly superior to the billion-dollar capital cost initially implied.

Why Housing Instead of Wages: California's Dysfunctional Finance System

Several factors explain the district's preference for complex housing development over simpler salary increases:

State Funding Constraints: California's Local Control Funding Formula allocates funding based primarily on student enrollment and demographics, not local cost of living. San Diego Unified receives similar per-pupil funding as inland districts with 50% lower housing costs. Teacher salaries require recurring general fund commitments that districts cannot unilaterally increase beyond state formulas. Collective bargaining agreements require sustainable funding sources.

Funding Structure Rigidities: Capital improvement bonds (voter-approved debt) can finance facilities but not salaries. California Education Code often restricts property sale proceeds—if original acquisition used bond funds, sale revenue might require return to bondholders or restriction to capital projects only, unavailable for salaries or operations. Housing development might access bond financing, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, and state/federal affordable housing programs unavailable for salary budgets.

Proposition 13 Constraints: California's property tax limitations restrict local revenue growth. Parcel taxes require two-thirds voter approval, making local revenue enhancement extremely difficult.

Pension Multiplication: California State Teachers' Retirement System requires employer contributions currently around 19% of salary. Every salary increase triggers proportional pension cost increases, making compensation enhancements more expensive than nominal wage gains suggest.

Political Calculations: Affordable housing development generates positive publicity and demonstrates innovation. Salary increases, while more efficient, lack comparable political appeal and may trigger taxpayer resistance.

Asset Leveraging Advantages: The district owns valuable real estate in high-cost neighborhoods. Ground leases or public-private partnerships might generate housing without direct capital outlay, whereas salary increases demand immediate cash flow. Rental income provides ongoing revenue stream; property sales provide one-time infusion quickly consumed by operating deficits.

Legal and Governance Complications

California Education Code authorizes districts to use property for "educational purposes," but large-scale workforce housing tests this definition's boundaries. Potential legal challenges include fiduciary duty questions (directing resources toward real estate rather than educational programs), fair housing compliance requirements, and California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review processes that opposition groups could exploit to delay or block projects.

National Context: Unprecedented Scale

San Diego Unified's ambition is virtually unprecedented among American K-12 districts. Santa Clara Unified's teacher housing project totaled 70 units at approximately $33 million—a far smaller scale requiring nearly a decade from concept to completion. Los Angeles Unified has discussed teacher housing but not implemented major developments. While university systems routinely provide faculty housing in expensive markets (Stanford, UC Berkeley, Harvard), K-12 districts have rarely attempted comparable programs.

The scarcity of similar programs nationwide suggests either that most districts recognize the economic inefficiency or that legal/financial barriers prevent implementation.

The Execution Risk Question

The improved financial case doesn't eliminate all concerns:

Development Expertise: School boards lack real estate development experience. Selecting developers, negotiating complex partnerships, and overseeing construction requires sophistication most districts don't possess.

Financing Complexity: Structuring LIHTC transactions, securing tax-exempt bond ratings, and managing compliance requirements demands specialized expertise. Districts might pay premium fees to consultants and intermediaries, eroding economic benefits.

Market Risk: Construction cost overruns, delays, or changes in housing demand could leave districts with failed projects and stranded investments.

Management Burden: Operating rental housing—tenant screening, maintenance, evictions, compliance—represents a major ongoing obligation unrelated to educational mission. Most districts would contract this to professional property managers at 5-10% of gross rents.

Employee Preference Uncertainty: Without survey data on how many employees would actually use district housing, the district risks building housing that employees don't want or that serves a minority while leaving most staff unhelped. Would younger teachers prefer higher salaries enabling saving for eventual home purchase? Do veteran teachers near retirement prefer compensation over housing they won't need long-term?

Critical Questions Unanswered

San Diego Unified's housing initiative proceeds without public disclosure of:

Total development costs and cost per unit projections
Financing mechanisms and debt service obligations
Funding sources and impact on instructional budgets
Income eligibility criteria and employee prioritization systems
Rent calculation methodologies and subsidy levels
Property management plans and ongoing operational costs
Opportunity cost analysis comparing housing to salary alternatives
Long-term financial sustainability and exit strategies
Employee demand data and preference surveys

These omissions prevent informed public evaluation of whether the initiative represents sound fiscal stewardship or expensive diversion from more effective solutions.

The district's failure to provide these details suggests either incomplete planning or deliberate obfuscation of politically sensitive information—particularly the connection between enrollment decline, school closures, and surplus property availability.

What Academic Research Shows

Academic research on teacher retention consistently identifies compensation as the primary factor in career decisions, particularly in high-cost markets. The Learning Policy Institute's comprehensive California studies found that salary competitiveness predicted retention rates more strongly than any other variable.

Housing assistance programs, while valued by recipients, typically serve small fractions of workforces and generate limited retention effects compared to across-the-board compensation improvements. University faculty housing studies show such programs benefit primarily senior employees who can wait for limited units, while doing little to attract entry-level workers.

Economic research on housing subsidies versus cash transfers generally favors cash as more efficient, allowing recipients to optimize their individual housing/consumption tradeoffs rather than constraining choices to specific developments.

The Broader Policy Implications

The initiative signals California public agencies' growing willingness to assume roles traditionally reserved for private developers. This reflects what economists call "market failure"—private housing markets cannot provide shelter affordable to middle-income public employees in California's coastal cities.

Yet the approach raises fundamental questions about governmental competence and mission focus. Should school districts redirect limited resources and management attention toward real estate development, or should they concentrate on core educational functions while advocating for systemic solutions?

The California Legislative Analyst's Office has recommended state-level solutions including increased teacher compensation, student loan forgiveness programs, and regional housing development incentives as more sustainable approaches than district-by-district housing projects. However, legislative gridlock has prevented comprehensive action, leaving local agencies to improvise.

The economic analysis reveals a paradox at the heart of California governance: Byzantine funding structures, legal constraints, and political dynamics may make an $800 million housing development more achievable than an $80 million salary increase—revealing deep dysfunction in how the state finances and manages public education.

Conclusion: Creative Solution or Systemic Dysfunction?

San Diego Unified's housing initiative demonstrates creativity in addressing workforce challenges while potentially leveraging enrollment decline's silver lining. If the program repurposes surplus property rather than consuming scarce capital, and if developer financing covers construction costs, the district might deliver substantial employee benefits at minimal budget impact while retaining valuable assets.

This transforms the analysis from "questionable use of $1B" to "creative asset monetization generating ongoing value." The comparison to outright property sales becomes less favorable—sales provide one-time restricted revenue while housing creates perpetual employee benefits and income streams.

However, the fundamental question persists: A hybrid approach—converting surplus property to housing (serving ~11% of workforce) AND advocating for salary increases (benefiting all 13,000 employees)—need not be mutually exclusive if housing is self-financing. The programs could work in tandem.

Yet without full transparency about financing, costs, risks, and employee preferences, the public cannot evaluate whether this represents innovative problem-solving or elaborate evasion of simpler solutions. The district owes taxpayers and employees clear answers before committing to a program of unprecedented scale and complexity.

The initiative deserves serious consideration as potentially sound fiscal policy rather than reflexive criticism—but only with accountability mechanisms ensuring promises match reality. California's school finance dysfunction has grown so severe that massive real estate development projects appear more feasible than simply paying teachers adequately—a systemically absurd situation regardless of any individual project's merits.

Following developer selection at the January meetings, San Diego Unified will enter negotiation phases before returning final plans to the board later in 2026. Whether this ambitious experiment succeeds or fails will likely influence similar efforts across California's struggling school districts.

Sidebar: The Uncomfortable Reality: Teachers in Subsidized Housing, Students in Tents

San Diego Unified's ambitious workforce housing plan unfolds against a backdrop that exposes uncomfortable truths about American inequality and institutional priorities. While the district plans 1,500 apartments for teachers and staff, approximately 8,000 of its students—8.4% of total enrollment—are experiencing homelessness.

The numbers are stark: San Diego County reported 19,841 homeless students for the 2024-25 school year, a 10% increase from the prior year. That figure represents only children, not their parents. San Diego Unified accounts for nearly 40% of the county's homeless student population, with the count increasing 16% in a single year—adding 1,053 students who lack "a fixed, adequate, and permanent residence."

The district defines student homelessness broadly under the McKinney-Vento Act: children living in shared residences, hotels, trailer parks, transitional accommodations, shelters, or unsheltered entirely. In the 2022-23 school year, nearly 740 San Diego County students were "temporarily unsheltered"—living on the streets, in cars, or in encampments. Close to 370 San Diego Unified students lived in hotels or motels.

The district has responded with compassion programs: converting the former Central Elementary School into a safe parking lot for 40 homeless families, providing clothing, hygiene items, school supplies, transportation, and connecting families to temporary housing. The Youth in Transition Department coordinates these services, and the district recognizes November as Homeless Youth Awareness Month.

Yet the resource allocation raises questions impossible to ignore: Can a district justify developing $600-800 million in workforce housing serving 11% of employees while 8.4% of students lack stable homes? The teacher housing initiative, if fully realized, would house approximately 1,500 families at an estimated cost of $500,000-550,000 per unit. The safe parking lot for homeless students accommodates 40 families.

The Ethical Calculus

Defenders of the teacher housing initiative would argue the programs serve different purposes and aren't mutually exclusive:

The Case for Teacher Housing:

Addresses workforce retention crisis threatening educational quality for all students
Leverages surplus property that enrollment decline has created
Potentially self-financing through public-private partnerships and rental income
Serves district's core mission by ensuring adequate staffing
Benefits students indirectly through teacher stability and reduced turnover

The Counterargument:

Prioritizes middle-class professionals over the district's most vulnerable population
$800M investment in employee benefits while students sleep in cars
Creates two-tier system: subsidized housing for staff, minimal support for homeless families
Optics of spending more per teacher apartment ($500K) than annual starting teacher salary ($52K)
Demonstrates institutional capacity to mobilize resources—but for whom?

The comparison becomes more pointed when examining per-capita investment:

Teacher housing: $500,000-550,000 per unit (capital cost)
Homeless student support: Safe parking for 40 families, modest services budget
Housing units planned: 1,500 for employees vs. 40 for homeless students
Population served: 11% of workforce vs. 8.4% of student body

The Broader Context: Who Deserves Housing?

This tension reflects America's long-standing prioritization of employed, middle-class families over those experiencing poverty or homelessness. Housing policy has traditionally rewarded work—employer-provided housing, mortgage interest deductions, workforce housing developments—while providing minimal support for those unable to participate in conventional employment.

San Diego Unified's approach mirrors corporate and university models: Stanford, Google, and Facebook provide employee housing because it serves institutional interests. The difference is that corporations don't simultaneously serve populations of homeless children. School districts occupy an uncomfortable middle ground—public institutions serving both employees and vulnerable students, forced to choose resource allocation.

The district's homeless student programs provide essential services but operate on vastly smaller scale than the housing initiative. The safe parking lot cost roughly $2-3 million to develop (exact figures not publicly disclosed). The district's total spending on homeless student services likely totals $5-10 million annually—a fraction of the proposed teacher housing investment.

Alternative Approaches: What If?

If the district applied the housing development's scale and ambition to student homelessness:

$800M Directed at Homeless Students Could:

Provide permanent supportive housing for all 8,000 homeless students and families (~$100K per family)
Create comprehensive wraparound services: mental health, tutoring, job training
Fund rapid rehousing programs preventing homelessness before it occurs
Build mixed-income developments prioritizing families with school-age children
Establish district-operated family shelters with on-site educational support

Hybrid Approach:

Dedicate 20% of teacher housing units (300 apartments) to homeless student families
Create mixed-income developments: teachers, support staff, and vulnerable families
Use teacher housing rents to cross-subsidize homeless family units
Design communities fostering interaction between middle-class employees and struggling families
Model integrated housing reducing segregation by income

But such approaches face practical obstacles: homeless families often need intensive support services beyond housing; mixing populations with vastly different needs creates management challenges; teacher unions might resist sharing dedicated workforce housing; and public housing for poor families carries stigma that workforce housing avoids.

The Hard Questions

Several uncomfortable questions demand consideration:

Is workforce housing more valuable than student housing? Teacher retention affects all 95,000 students; housing 8,000 homeless children affects only those families. Does utilitarian calculus justify prioritizing the majority's interests? Or do the most vulnerable students deserve priority consideration?

Does housing teachers ultimately help homeless students? Stable, well-compensated teachers potentially provide better education for all students, including those experiencing homelessness. Does improving educational quality through workforce retention justify the allocation? Or is this rationalization for serving institutional convenience over moral obligation?

Can the district do both? If teacher housing is largely self-financing through surplus property and developer partnerships, does it actually divert resources from homeless student services? Or would the land and capital sit idle anyway, helping no one?

What about parents? The 8,000 homeless students represent perhaps 4,000-5,000 families. Many parents work low-wage jobs—food service, retail, custodial, healthcare support. Should the district prioritize housing its own custodians and food service workers over families of students in similar occupations outside the district?

Where does institutional responsibility end? School districts exist to educate, not house populations. Should San Diego Unified redirect resources toward housing students, or is that properly the responsibility of housing authorities, social services, and broader government? Does the district's willingness to house employees but not students reveal its true priorities?

The Political Reality

The truth underlying these tensions is political, not moral: middle-class employees vote, advocate, and wield collective bargaining power. Homeless families, disproportionately immigrant, low-income, and politically marginalized, do not. Teacher unions can negotiate workforce housing demands; homeless students cannot.

Board President Richard Barrera—himself a labor leader before joining the board—understands this dynamic. Workforce housing generates union support, positive press coverage, and political capital. Homeless student services, while compassionate, generate less political return and risk association with poverty programs that affluent voters resist.

The district's budget allocation reflects these realities: 85% of spending goes to employee compensation, leaving minimal discretionary funds for programs serving students directly. Additional workforce benefits are politically easier to justify than expanded social services.

What Neighboring Districts Are Doing

San Diego Unified is not alone in facing this tension:

Los Angeles Unified has discussed teacher housing but also operates the nation's largest school-based homeless student support system, including on-campus housing at some schools.

Santa Clara Unified's 70-unit teacher housing project cost $33 million—but the district also partners with county homeless services to provide family housing assistance.

San Francisco Unified provides down payment assistance for teacher home purchases but also operates comprehensive homeless student services and coordinates with city housing programs.

No district has resolved the fundamental tension between employee needs and student vulnerability. Most simply serve both inadequately.

The Moral Hazard

Perhaps the most troubling aspect is the precedent: if school districts become primary housing providers for middle-class employees, what message does this send about government's proper role? If public agencies must develop real estate to retain workers, has California's housing crisis rendered normal compensation structures obsolete? And if districts house teachers but not students, what does this reveal about whose comfort matters in American society?

The McKinney-Vento Act requires districts to provide transportation, supplies, and academic support to homeless students. It does not require housing teachers. Yet San Diego Unified is pursuing the latter with far greater resources than the former. The district is meeting its legal obligations to homeless students while exceeding those obligations for employees.

This reflects a broader American reality: we provide for those who serve systems more generously than those systems ostensibly serve. Teachers deserve stable housing—but so do children. The question is not whether to house teachers or students, but why a wealthy society cannot manage to house both.

Sources:

Voice of San Diego. "The Learning Curve: County Sees Surge in Homeless Students." May 28, 2025.
San Diego Unified School District. "SD Unified Delivers Support to Students and Families Experiencing Homelessness." 2025.
CBS8 San Diego. "How many homeless students in San Diego County." 2024.
San Diego Union-Tribune. "Homelessness counts can be confusing." June 1, 2025.
County of San Diego, Health and Human Services Agency. "Persons Experiencing Homeless in San Diego County, 2023-2025." August 2025.

Verified Sources and Citations

Aere, Jacob. "Affordable housing for staff on San Diego school board agenda." KPBS, January 26, 2026. https://www.kpbs.org/news/local/2026/01/26/affordable-housing-for-staff-on-san-diego-school-board-agenda
Terner Center for Housing Innovation, UC Berkeley. "The Cost of Building Housing Series." 2025. https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/
California Department of Education. "Local Control Funding Formula Overview" and "California Teacher Workforce Data." 2024-2025. https://www.cde.ca.gov/
California Department of Finance. "K-12 Graded Enrollment Projections by County." 2025. https://dof.ca.gov/forecasting/demographics/
Learning Policy Institute. "California's Teacher Shortage: An Urgent Call to Action." 2024. https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/
National Education Association. "Rankings and Estimates: Rankings of the States 2024 and Estimates of School Statistics 2025." https://www.nea.org/
Economic Policy Institute. "Teacher Pay Penalty Report." 2024. https://www.epi.org/
Public Policy Institute of California. "California's Housing Shortage" and "Declining Student Enrollment in California's K-12 Public Schools." 2024-2025. https://www.ppic.org/
San Diego Unified School District. "Budget Overview 2024-2025" and "Salary Schedules 2025-2026." https://www.sandiegounified.org/
California State Teachers' Retirement System. "Employer Contribution Rates." https://www.calstrs.com/
California Legislative Analyst's Office. "The 2024-25 Budget: California's Fiscal Outlook" and "Addressing California's Teacher Shortage." https://lao.ca.gov/
San Diego County Taxpayers Association. "San Diego Unified School District Debt Analysis." 2024. https://www.sdcta.org/
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Coalition. "LIHTC Program Overview and Economics." https://www.taxcreditcoalition.org/
Urban Land Institute. "Public-Private Partnerships in Affordable Housing Development." 2024. https://uli.org/
Urban Institute. "Housing Assistance Versus Cash Transfers: Comparative Effectiveness." 2023. https://www.urban.org/
Santa Clara Unified School District. "Educator Housing Project Development Timeline." https://www.scusd.net/
EdSource. "California School District Budget Trends" and "California's Declining Enrollment Creates Tough Choices." 2024-2025. https://edsource.org/
California School Boards Association. "Managing Facility Implications of Declining Enrollment." 2024. https://www.csba.org/

Note: Construction cost estimates, financial calculations, and comparative analyses represent synthesis of publicly available data and standard California education finance methodologies. Specific San Diego Unified project costs remain undisclosed in public documents reviewed.

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San Diego Schools Bet $800 Million on Teacher Housing Instead of Higher Pay—