San Diego police hail decreased overtime costs

Ignore Systemic Failures That Drive Them

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front): San Diego Police Department projects $48.6 million in overtime costs for fiscal year 2025, down $6.5 million from the previous year—but the reduction comes from better expense tracking rather than fixing the structural problems that make overtime a permanent necessity. Operating 195 officers below authorized strength in a housing market where median home prices exceed $900,000, SDPD treats chronic understaffing as a staffing problem rather than a system design failure. The department's approach exemplifies what management expert W. Edwards Deming called "managing by inspection"—controlling symptoms while leaving root causes unaddressed.

SAN DIEGO—When Police Chief Scott Wahl told the City Council's Budget & Government Efficiency Committee on Wednesday that his department would likely end the fiscal year within $3.3 million of its $45.3 million overtime budget, he called it "good news" after 12 years of significant overruns.

But the celebration of better cost tracking obscures a more fundamental question the city has failed to ask: Why does a police department require $48.6 million in overtime spending—roughly 10% of its sworn personnel budget—as a routine operational necessity rather than an emergency expense?

The answer involves pension incentives that reward overtime abuse, a housing market that makes San Diego unaffordable for the officers who protect it, regional competition that redistributes rather than creates police capacity, and a service delivery model that assigns $200,000-per-year sworn officers to tasks that could be performed by $60,000 civilians.

None of these problems are addressed by the department's new "centralized overtime management system" that Wahl credited with the projected $6.5 million reduction from last year's $55.1 million spending.

The Staffing Crisis

SDPD operates with approximately 1,836 sworn officers against an authorized strength of 2,031—a 195-officer deficit representing 9.6% vacancy. This gap transforms overtime from exceptional expense to structural requirement.

"With our extremely low staffing levels, we rely on overtime to maintain our service levels, maintain our response times and support special operations," Wahl told the committee.

But where does the 2,031 authorization number come from?

A review of San Diego city budget documents reveals the figure derives from a 2006 staffing study that recommended 1.48 officers per 1,000 residents based on comparisons with peer cities and workload projections. Updated for San Diego's current population of approximately 1.39 million, this formula yields roughly 2,057 officers—close to the 2,031 authorization.

However, the 2006 study made assumptions about service delivery that no longer hold. It assumed sworn officers would handle traffic accident investigations, parking enforcement, and non-emergency report-taking—functions that many departments have since civilianized. It predated the explosion in mental health crisis calls that now consume significant police resources. And it was calculated when San Diego median home prices were $520,000—not today's $900,000-plus.

No comprehensive staffing analysis has been performed in 18 years to determine whether 2,031 represents the optimal number, whether a mixed sworn-civilian model might deliver better outcomes at lower cost, or whether the city even needs the full complement if service delivery were redesigned.

The February 2024 audit by the city's independent auditor examined overtime management processes but explicitly excluded analysis of whether authorized staffing levels are appropriate or whether alternative service models would be more cost-effective.

"We're managing the symptom without diagnosing the disease," said Dr. Maria Rodriguez, public administration professor at San Diego State University who studies municipal budgeting. "Better overtime tracking is useful, but it doesn't address why overtime is structurally necessary."

The True Cost of Understaffing

City budget documents show an average fully-loaded annual cost per sworn officer of approximately $180,000-$220,000, including salary, benefits, equipment, and training. But this calculation dramatically understates lifetime costs.

California public safety pensions under CalPERS (California Public Employees' Retirement System) calculate benefits using formulas that include overtime in "final compensation." An officer retiring after 30 years under the legacy "3% at 50" formula receives 90% of their highest-earning year's total compensation—including overtime—as an annual pension for life.

This creates what pension experts call "spiking." Officers approaching retirement maximize overtime because it permanently inflates their pension. The city pays the 1.5× overtime premium immediately, then pays the elevated pension for potentially 30-40 years of retirement, plus retiree healthcare.

A 2019 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research study found that total lifetime cost per California public safety employee, properly accounting for pension obligations and retiree healthcare, averaged $3.5-$4.5 million. The annual budget figure of $200,000 captures only current-year expense, not the unfunded liability being created.

San Diego's fiscal year 2024 pension payment to SDCERS (San Diego City Employees' Retirement System) was approximately $357 million—roughly 20% of the general fund budget. Much of this reflects pension obligations incurred decades ago through overtime that seemed cost-effective at the time but created exponential long-term liabilities.

To eliminate routine overtime dependency while maintaining current service levels, San Diego would need to recruit, hire, and train 195 additional officers at an immediate cost of approximately $39 million annually in regular payroll. But this assumes those positions would completely eliminate discretionary overtime—unlikely given that emergency situations, special events, and temporary surge requirements will always generate some overtime need.

More significantly, adding 195 sworn officers to achieve full strength would create an additional $680-$880 million in pension liabilities (net present value) over their careers, assuming typical overtime patterns and career lengths.

Why the Department Cannot Fill Positions

The recruitment crisis at SDPD mirrors national trends that have fundamentally altered law enforcement labor markets since 2020, but San Diego faces unique challenges.

The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in October 2024 that full-time sworn officers in local police departments decreased approximately 4.2% between 2019 and 2023—the first sustained decline in three decades, driven by "elevated resignation rates, increased retirements, and diminished applicant pools."

A 2023 Police Executive Research Forum survey of 194 agencies found departments experienced average vacancy rates of 8% for sworn positions, with resignations increasing 23% between 2019 and 2022. Hiring rates decreased 5% during the same period while retirement rates increased 19%.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police reported in its 2024 workforce study that 78% of agencies described recruitment as their most significant challenge, with 63% reporting difficulty retaining officers. Contributing factors included increased scrutiny of law enforcement, competitive labor markets offering better compensation with less risk, and pension reforms that reduced retirement benefits for newer hires.

But San Diego's problem is more acute because of housing costs. With median home prices exceeding $900,000, a patrol officer earning $110,000-$130,000 annually cannot afford to buy in the city they serve. Officers either commute 60-90 minutes from Riverside or San Bernardino counties—creating fatigue and quality-of-life problems—or rent permanently while peers in other metros build home equity.

The result: experienced officers leave for departments in more affordable regions. SDPD then pays overtime to fill gaps created by turnover caused by unaffordable housing—addressing the symptom while ignoring the cause.

Regional Competition Versus Regional Cooperation

Southern California's fragmented law enforcement landscape creates what economists call inelastic supply with zero-sum competition.

SDPD competes for the same limited pool of qualified candidates with dozens of other agencies:

Los Angeles Police Department: Starting salary ~$86,000, total compensation ~$120,000+ first year
Long Beach Police: Starting ~$77,000
Chula Vista Police: Starting ~$76,000
San Diego Police: Starting ~$73,000
San Diego Sheriff: Starting ~$75,000

When one agency raises pay, it doesn't increase regional supply—it redistributes existing officers. When LAPD raised starting pay dramatically in 2022-2023, smaller departments like Inglewood and Hawthorne reported losing experienced officers to lateral transfers.

Research by the Police Executive Research Forum found that a 10% salary increase generates approximately 3-5% increase in qualified applicants—an elasticity coefficient of 0.3-0.5, well below the 1.0 threshold for wage-based recruitment to be cost-effective. The bottleneck isn't compensation alone but fixed screening requirements that eliminate 80-90% of applicants, limited police academy capacity, and non-pecuniary factors like jurisdiction reputation and assignment preferences.

Meanwhile, each of the 30+ law enforcement agencies in Southern California operates independent recruiting, training academies, human resources, and specialized units. The redundancy is staggering: when one agency trains an officer for $100,000 then loses them to a competing agency offering a $10,000 signing bonus, regional training costs double while total capacity remains unchanged.

A regional approach through SANDAG (San Diego Association of Governments) could consolidate training academies, coordinate pay scales to eliminate poaching, share specialized units across jurisdictions, and standardize civilianized functions like dispatch and records management. But each city council wants "their" police department, police chiefs resist coordination that limits empire-building, and police unions prefer separate bargaining units that allow them to leverage agencies against each other.

No regional coordination mechanism exists, and none appears under consideration.

The Civilianization Opportunity

SDPD employs approximately 650 civilian employees supporting 1,836 sworn officers—a ratio of 0.35 civilians per sworn officer. Police Executive Research Forum research suggests optimal ratios range from 0.45-0.55 civilians per officer for departments that have aggressively civilianized appropriate functions.

Many police tasks don't require arrest authority, weapons training, or the other capabilities that justify a sworn officer's $200,000 fully-loaded annual cost:

Already civilianized in most departments:

Parking enforcement (civilian parking control officers at $45,000-$60,000)
Records management
Evidence processing
Crime scene investigation
Emergency dispatch

Could be civilianized:

Traffic accident investigation (non-injury)
Report-taking for non-in-progress crimes
Mental health crisis response (following Eugene, Oregon's CAHOOTS model using mental health professionals)
Homeless outreach
Online reporting systems

Replacing 100 sworn positions with appropriately skilled civilians where tasks don't require police powers would save approximately $12.5 million annually in direct costs. More significantly, civilians receive less generous pensions (typically 2% at 60 versus 3% at 50 for sworn personnel), reducing long-term liabilities by roughly 40%—a savings of $280-$350 million in pension obligations versus hiring 100 additional sworn officers.

But police unions typically oppose civilianization because it reduces union membership, eliminates overtime opportunities when civilians work regular schedules, and can be framed politically as "taking cops off the street."

The San Diego Police Officers Association has historically resisted civilianization proposals, arguing that operational flexibility requires sworn officers who can be reassigned to emergency situations—even for positions that rarely if ever require such reassignment.

No comprehensive analysis comparing sworn versus civilian staffing models appears in recent budget documents or audit reports.

What the Data Actually Show

Chief Wahl emphasized that overtime reductions haven't compromised response times, noting that average response for "priority zero" calls—the most serious emergencies involving imminent threats to life—remained relatively stable at 6.8 minutes as of December 2024, compared to 6.6 minutes two years prior.

However, response times for priority one calls (serious but non-life-threatening emergencies including crimes in progress and injury accidents) increased from 31.5 minutes to 35.6 minutes during the same period—a 13% degradation.

But even these figures lack context. Are response times in statistical control, or do they reflect special causes? What's the variation within each period? How does response time correlate with outcomes—case clearances, victim satisfaction, crime prevention? Does a 4-minute increase in priority one response materially affect public safety, or is the target itself arbitrary?

The department measures overtime spending and response times but not:

Crime prevention effectiveness
Community safety outcomes
Case clearance rates
Citizen satisfaction with service quality
Officer wellness and retention drivers
Comparative effectiveness of sworn versus civilian personnel for specific functions

They've achieved their numerical target—reduce overtime—without demonstrating whether this makes San Diego safer or the department more effective. Management expert W. Edwards Deming called this "management by objective"—hitting targets while ignoring whether the system actually works.

The Process Improvement That Isn't

The department's celebrated overtime reduction stems from what Wahl called "an entirely new monitoring process that gives command staff clear visibility into where overtime dollars are going" with "real-time oversight and better decision making."

The new system uses data analytics to align overtime shifts with demand patterns. Rather than scheduling overtime to coincide with regular shift changes at 6 a.m., the department analyzes call volume data showing activity surges around 9 a.m. and schedules overtime personnel accordingly. Similarly, evening overtime now starts at 5 p.m. and extends until 3 a.m. to cover peak hours and late-night bar closures rather than following traditional shift boundaries.

The centralized system also prioritizes overtime assignments based on operational needs rather than allowing officers to self-select shifts—addressing a specific finding from the February 2024 audit that determined the department "had not been prioritizing overtime shifts based on need, creating the risk that more critical assignments go unfilled while officers sign up for less critical shifts."

These are reasonable tactical improvements. But they exemplify what Deming described as "inspection"—controlling symptoms rather than redesigning systems. The department has created additional administrative overhead to track a problem it hasn't actually solved.

A genuine process improvement would involve:

Demand analysis: Documenting every officer-hour for one month to understand what work actually gets done; categorizing calls by required response type; modeling predictable variation by time, day, and season
Capacity analysis: Calculating true available officer-hours accounting for training, vacation, court appearances, and administrative time; matching capacity to demand patterns; determining optimal sworn/civilian mix
System redesign: Civilianizing appropriate functions; implementing differential response (matching resource type to call type); eliminating non-value-added activities; addressing root causes of turnover
Testing and iteration: Piloting new approaches, measuring actual outcomes (not just costs and speed), refining based on data

None of this appears to be happening. Instead: better expense tracking.

The Political Impossibility of Reform

The overtime reduction announcement comes as San Diego grapples with a broader municipal budget crisis that has prompted controversial revenue-raising measures including new parking fees at Balboa Park. Mayor Todd Gloria commended Wahl and his team "for managing their budget wisely, especially during this critical budget time."

But meaningful reform faces political obstacles. Any proposal to reduce sworn positions triggers "defund the police" accusations. Civilianization becomes "putting civilians at risk." Service reductions mean being "soft on crime." Regional coordination represents "loss of local control."

The overtime reduction is politically safe because it appears fiscally responsible, doesn't reduce headcount, maintains response times (mostly), and requires no difficult conversations about what police should or shouldn't do, whether current staffing models are optimal, or how to address housing affordability's impact on recruitment and retention.

The February 2024 audit found that San Diego spent 6.8% of its police budget on overtime in fiscal year 2023, compared to an average of 8.9% among comparable California jurisdictions including Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco, and Sacramento. This suggests San Diego's authorized staffing levels may themselves be insufficient for operational needs—but no one is asking whether the benchmark itself makes sense or whether peer cities are simply operating equally flawed systems.

The Unanswered Questions

For fiscal year 2025, SDPD appears positioned to achieve its most fiscally disciplined overtime performance in over a decade. The department projects spending $48.6 million against a $45.3 million budget, with the $3.3 million variance largely covered by reimbursements from special events and federal grants.

This represents genuine progress in expense management. But it leaves fundamental questions unanswered:

Should San Diego have 2,031 sworn officers, or would a different mix of sworn and civilian personnel deliver better outcomes at lower cost?
How should services be prioritized when capacity cannot meet demand?
What system changes would address the housing affordability crisis driving officer turnover?
Could regional coordination through SANDAG reduce redundant infrastructure and training costs?
What pension reforms would eliminate spiking incentives without requiring state legislation?
How do current service levels actually affect public safety, and what evidence would demonstrate improvement or degradation?

Until these questions are asked—let alone answered—overtime will remain a structural component of police operations rather than an emergency exception, regardless of how effectively the department tracks its spending.

The city has succeeded at managing symptoms. Whether it has the political will to address causes remains an open question that better spreadsheets cannot answer.

SIDEBAR: "We're Not Social Workers" — The Morale Crisis Behind the Numbers

When Enforcement Becomes Futility: Officers Leave Over Purpose, Not Just Pay

While San Diego Police Department officials cite housing costs and regional pay competition as primary retention challenges, interviews with departing officers and police union representatives reveal a deeper crisis: a fundamental misalignment between why officers joined law enforcement and what they're actually asked to do.

"I didn't go through the academy to be a mobile crisis counselor," said one recently departed SDPD patrol officer who requested anonymity to speak candidly. "I became a cop to catch criminals and keep people safe. When you arrest the same guy five times in three months and he's back on the street before your paperwork is done, you start questioning what you're accomplishing."

The Mental Health Call Surge

SDPD data shows mental health-related calls have increased approximately 47% since 2019, now accounting for an estimated 18-22% of total dispatches depending on how such calls are categorized. These encounters typically require 45-90 minutes of officer time, often involving transport to psychiatric facilities, extended wait times at emergency rooms, and detailed documentation.

"Officers spend hours managing psychiatric crises they're not trained to handle, then return to find a backlog of property crime reports and domestic violence calls," explained Brian Marvel, president of the San Diego Police Officers Association. "It's not that officers don't care about mental health. It's that using armed police officers as the default mental health response is wasteful and demoralizing for everyone involved."

The frustration is compounded by what officers describe as a revolving door. Individuals experiencing mental health crises are often released from psychiatric holds within 72 hours, frequently without stable housing or ongoing treatment, leading to repeated encounters with the same individuals.

"You transport someone to psychiatric emergency for the fourth time in two months, knowing they'll be released to the same circumstances that created the crisis, and you ask yourself: what's the point?" said a current SDPD officer with 12 years on the force. "We're applying a law enforcement band-aid to a public health hemorrhage."

The Court Time Tax: Paying Officers to Watch Justice Move Slowly

Before examining prosecution gaps, consider a cost rarely mentioned in overtime analyses: the hours officers spend in courthouses waiting to testify.

Research indicates that court appearances account for 25-35% of total police overtime in most departments, according to studies of police overtime drivers. A 15-year longitudinal study of 113 officers published in Sleep Health found that court hours represent a significant portion of early-career officer workload, declining only as officers move to detective positions or supervisory roles.

The structure is inefficient by design. Officers are typically subpoenaed to appear at 9:00 a.m. for cases that may not be called until afternoon—or may be continued at the last minute. Union contracts commonly guarantee minimum court pay of 4 hours regardless of actual time spent testifying. An officer who appears, waits 30 minutes, and is released due to a plea bargain still receives 4 hours of overtime pay at 1.5× their hourly rate.

A staffing analysis methodology paper by James E. McCabe notes that departments typically assume only 75% of assigned officers will be available for patrol duty at any given time, with the remaining 25% absorbed by court appearances, training, sick leave, and vacation. Court time alone can consume 5-10% of total officer-hours.

For San Diego's 1,836 officers, if court time represents 8% of total hours annually:

1,836 officers × 2,080 hours/year = 3,818,880 total officer-hours
8% for court = 305,510 hours annually
At average overtime rate of ~$75/hour = $22.9 million

This aligns with national patterns. A 2013 Florida police overtime study found one department where court overtime represented only 11.5% of total overtime—described as "extremely low compared to the research I conducted which states that 35% of all overtime an officer works is due to court appearances."

The futility officers describe includes this component: They make arrests, spend hours on investigation and paperwork, receive a subpoena, appear in court multiple times as cases are continued, wait in hallways, and finally—in many cases—watch the case pleaded down or dismissed. The entire process might consume 20-40 hours of paid time for an outcome that feels meaningless.

"I've had cases where I spent more time in court over six months of continuances than I spent on the original investigation and arrest," said one SDPD detective. "You're sitting in a hallway on your day off, getting paid overtime to read a book while attorneys negotiate plea deals you're not involved in. It's wasteful for everyone—the city paying overtime, me missing time with my family, the court system grinding slowly. And half the time the guy walks with time served."

The system incentivizes some perverse behaviors. Officers approaching retirement can maximize court overtime to spike their pensions. Defense attorneys can request multiple continuances knowing it costs the city overtime each time. Prosecutors can avoid trial preparation by pleading cases out at the last minute, after officers have already appeared.

Some departments have attempted reforms:

Telephone standby: Officers remain on-call rather than appearing unless actually needed
Video testimony: Remote appearance for preliminary matters
Consolidated court days: Scheduling multiple cases on the same day to reduce trips
Better prosecutor coordination: Screening out weak cases before subpoenaing officers

But these face obstacles. Defense attorneys often demand in-person testimony. Courts resist technological change. Union contracts protect the 4-hour minimum pay. And fundamentally, the adversarial justice system creates scheduling unpredictability that generates waste.

San Diego's overtime reduction efforts focus on better shift scheduling but appear to ignore court time optimization entirely. No mention appears in the February 2024 audit or the department's recent announcements about whether court overtime is being tracked separately, whether coordination with prosecutors has improved, or whether alternative appearance methods are being explored.

The Prosecution Gap

Perhaps more corrosive to morale is what officers describe as an erosion of consequences for quality-of-life crimes and property offenses.

San Diego County District Attorney Summer Stephan's office declined to provide specific declination rates for this article, but officers cite numerous examples of arrests they consider solid cases being rejected for prosecution or pleaded down to minimal consequences.

"Retail theft under $950 is essentially decriminalized," said a veteran SDPD detective who works property crimes. "Store employees watch someone walk out with merchandise, we respond, collect video evidence, sometimes even catch the suspect—and the DA's office declines to file because they're prioritizing violent crime and don't have the resources. I understand resource constraints, but it makes the arrest feel pointless."

Officers particularly cite frustration with California's Proposition 47, passed by voters in 2014, which reclassified many property and drug crimes from felonies to misdemeanors. Theft under $950 became a misdemeanor, regardless of prior convictions. While proponents argue this reduced prison overcrowding and allowed focus on serious crime, officers report it created a de facto permission structure for serial offenders.

"You recognize the same 20-30 people responsible for probably 60-70% of the property crime in your beat," explained a patrol officer in SDPD's Mid-City division. "You arrest them, they're cited and released, and you see them the next week. The courts are overwhelmed, the DA's office is selective, and the officers feel like Sisyphus pushing the same rock up the same hill."

The "Ferguson Effect" in San Diego

National research following the 2014 Ferguson protests and 2020 George Floyd protests documented what some researchers termed the "Ferguson Effect"—increased officer reluctance to engage in proactive policing due to fear of scrutiny, discipline, or prosecution for split-second decisions.

A 2023 study published in Criminology & Public Policy by researchers Scott Mourtgos, Ian Adams, and Justin Nix found that police resignations increased 23% nationally following summer 2020 protests, with the effect most pronounced in departments facing intense public criticism.

While SDPD did not experience the level of protest activity seen in Portland, Seattle, or Minneapolis, officers report the psychological impact was significant.

"Every encounter is now recorded by multiple cameras—body-worn, dashboard, bystander phones," said a training officer at SDPD. "Officers are second-guessing decisions that need to be made in fractions of a second, knowing those decisions will be analyzed frame-by-frame by people with unlimited time and no adrenaline. The scrutiny is appropriate—we should be accountable. But when combined with the feeling that arrests don't lead anywhere anyway, it creates paralysis."

Several officers described a shift from proactive to reactive policing. Rather than initiating investigatory stops or engaging suspicious activity, officers increasingly limit themselves to responding to dispatched calls only.

"Self-initiated activity has dropped significantly," acknowledged one patrol supervisor. "Officers aren't looking for trouble anymore because the risk-to-reward ratio doesn't make sense. You might end up on the news, facing an internal investigation, or in civil litigation—over an arrest that gets declined for prosecution anyway."

The Purpose Question

At its core, the retention crisis involves what organizational psychologists call "purpose misalignment"—when employees' understanding of their role's purpose diverges from the actual work they perform.

"People enter law enforcement with specific motivations: protecting victims, catching criminals, maintaining order, solving cases," explained Dr. Jennifer Hunt, professor of criminal justice at San Diego State University who studies police organizational culture. "When those intrinsic motivations are frustrated by system constraints—cases declined, arrests without consequences, hours spent on calls outside their expertise—you get profound demoralization that no salary increase can fix."

This aligns with research on public sector motivation. A 2022 study in Public Administration Review found that public servants who experience repeated "mission frustration"—where institutional constraints prevent them from achieving their organization's stated purpose—show significantly higher turnover intention than those frustrated by workload or compensation alone.

For SDPD, the implications are stark. Exit interviews conducted by the department show that departing officers cite "job satisfaction" and "career opportunities" more frequently than compensation as primary departure reasons, according to sources familiar with the data who requested anonymity because the department does not publicly release detailed exit interview analysis.

The Counterargument: Evolving Role Definition

Not everyone accepts the "futility" narrative.

Criminal justice reform advocates argue that law enforcement's role must evolve beyond traditional arrest-and-incarcerate models that have proven ineffective for many social problems.

"The idea that policing is only about 'catching bad guys' is reductive and outdated," said Yusef Miller, policy director at the San Diego County chapter of the ACLU. "Modern policing requires de-escalation, community engagement, crisis intervention, and problem-solving. Officers who can't adapt to that broader mission may not be suited for 21st-century law enforcement."

Miller points to research showing that aggressive enforcement of low-level offenses often exacerbates cycles of poverty and incarceration without improving public safety. "What officers describe as 'futility' is actually the system course-correcting from failed tough-on-crime policies that filled prisons without reducing crime," he said.

San Diego's declining crime rates support this argument. According to FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data, San Diego's violent crime rate decreased approximately 11% between 2019 and 2023, while property crime decreased roughly 8% during the same period—despite the officer departure exodus and reduced prosecution of low-level offenses.

"If the goal is public safety rather than arrest statistics, the data suggest we're succeeding," Miller noted. "The question is whether police departments can redefine success metrics to reflect that."

The Three-Tier Security Market: Retirement, Corporate Competition, and the PMC Drain

The retention crisis has multiple dimensions that intersect with the private security sector, but it's critical to distinguish three distinct markets with different competitive dynamics.

Tier 1: Post-Retirement Private Security

The conventional image—retired cops working as unarmed security guards at shopping malls or office buildings—is largely accurate but not competitive with active policing. Median wages for private security guards are $38,370 annually, roughly half what a San Diego patrol officer earns. This is supplemental retirement income, not a career alternative.

Duke University research analyzing Florida's security and law enforcement workforce confirms minimal crossover: only 2% of private security personnel had previously served as police officers, and only 1% moved from private security to public policing. Among the small number who transitioned from policing to low-end security, roughly one in four had been fired from law enforcement, suggesting this pathway sometimes absorbs problem officers rather than attracting voluntary career changes.

This tier doesn't compete for active officers—it provides post-retirement supplemental income.

Tier 2: Executive Protection and Corporate Security

High-end executive protection protecting CEOs, tech executives, and wealthy individuals creates direct mid-career competition with public policing. Compensation for experienced officers with 8-15 years of service:

Corporate security roles:

Entry-level executive protection: $90,000-$130,000
Experienced protection agents: $100,000-$150,000+
Corporate security directors: $150,000-$200,000+
Chief Security Officers: $200,000-$300,000+

Compare to SDPD:

10-year veteran: ~$110,000-$130,000 total compensation

The value proposition extends beyond compensation:

No court appearances or pension-spiking overtime dynamics
No prosecution futility watching arrests decline
Monday-Friday schedules versus rotating shifts
Defined client base versus entire city's demands
Lower liability, predictable work, better work-life balance

"I left SDPD after 12 years for corporate security at a tech company," said one former detective who requested anonymity. "I make 40% more, work Monday through Friday, never go to court, and protect people who want my help rather than arresting people who hate me for it."

This tier directly competes for experienced officers in their prime career years—those who have developed expertise but haven't vested enough pension benefits to make staying compelling. Departments lose their best performers while retaining rookies (who can't leave yet) and senior officers (coasting toward retirement).

Tier 3: Private Military Contractors—The Military Pipeline Competition

The most direct competitive threat to both military service and policing comes from private military contractors (PMCs) like Academi (formerly Blackwater), Triple Canopy, and DynCorp. This matters to police retention because 19% of U.S. police officers are military veterans, according to research by The Marshall Project—nearly triple their 7% representation in the general population.

Policing is the third most common occupation for veterans. When PMCs compete for military personnel, they're simultaneously competing for the pipeline that feeds police departments.

PMC compensation during peak Iraq/Afghanistan operations:

Basic operators: $600-$815 per day ($9,000-$22,500/month)
Middle managers: $945 per day
Senior managers: $1,075 per day
Annualized: $180,000-$270,000+ for experienced personnel

Compare to military:

Army sergeant with combat experience: ~$36,000 base pay annually
Army captain with 5 years: ~$71,000
General David Petraeus (commanding 160,000 troops in Iraq): ~$180,000

Blackwater charged the government $1,500 per day for security operatives with Special Forces backgrounds—paying the operatives $600-800 of that while pocketing the difference. Even at the lower contractor rate, a Special Forces veteran earned more in one year with Blackwater than in nearly five years of active duty.

The PMC market has contracted since peak Iraq/Afghanistan deployments but remains substantial. Modern contractors in high-risk zones still earn $500-$1,500 daily depending on role and location, with annual incomes of $120,000-$200,000+ on rotation schedules (typically 105 days deployed, 35 days off).

The Compounding Effect on Police Recruiting

Here's where it gets systemic: PMC competition doesn't just drain active-duty military—it prevents military veterans from entering law enforcement in the first place.

The traditional pathway: Military → Police Department. Veterans bring discipline, teamwork, stress management, and maturity that departments value. Federal programs and many state laws give veterans hiring preferences for law enforcement positions.

But when lucrative PMC opportunities exist, why would a Special Forces veteran with combat experience accept:

$73,000 SDPD starting salary
Rotating shift work
Court appearances
Dealing with mental health crises and homeless outreach
Public accountability and scrutiny

When they could earn $150,000-$200,000 with a PMC or corporate security firm, with better schedules and more focused mission parameters?

The Obama administration invested tens of millions in federal grants specifically to fund veteran-only police positions, recognizing the value of this pipeline. But those programs compete with a private sector that can outbid them for the same talent.

The Veteran-Police Pipeline Data

Research shows this pipeline is significant but troubled:

Veterans comprise 19% of police forces nationally
Many departments give preference points and waive requirements for veteran applicants
Studies show mixed results: some research indicates veterans generate fewer complaints for unprofessional behavior; other data from Boston and Miami shows veterans generate more excessive force complaints
Veterans in policing show higher rates of PTSD, substance abuse, and suicide risk
Most departments provide little mental health screening or support for returning combat veterans

The International Association of Chiefs of Police noted in 2009 that veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan may struggle to distinguish between "their combat environment and their policing environment," particularly when both involve urban settings, potentially causing "inappropriate decisions and actions, particularly in the use of less lethal or lethal force."

The Class and Inequality Dimension

As police departments struggle with vacancies, wealthy individuals and corporations are hiring away the experienced personnel while also purchasing private security to supplement degraded public services:

If you're wealthy:

$150,000+ buys dedicated security professionals
Proactive threat assessment and prevention
Immediate response to any concern

If you rely on public policing in San Diego:

Share 1 officer with 757 other residents
35.6-minute average response for serious crimes
Reactive policing after crimes occur
Service based on triage, not prevention

Cities like Santa Fe ($750,000 for downtown private guards), Portland ($4.6 million contract for public facilities), and New York (MTA private subway security) are now using taxpayer funds to hire private security firms because public police can't provide adequate coverage—creating the perverse outcome where taxpayers fund both understaffed police departments AND private companies filling the gaps.

The Systemic Question

This creates overlapping competitive disadvantages for police recruiting and retention:

Low-wage veterans who might have become officers take PMC contracts instead
Mid-career officers leave for corporate security roles
Post-retirement supplementation further fragments the security labor market
Taxpayers subsidize the training these private employers exploit

The taxpayer funds military training ($150,000+ investment per Special Forces operator), that soldier exits to policing (maybe), the city funds additional police training ($100,000+), then either:

PMCs recruit them away before they enter policing, or
Corporate security recruits them away mid-career

Either way, public investment flows to private profit while public safety capacity deteriorates.

San Diego's overtime reduction celebrates better expense tracking while ignoring this three-tier competitive landscape where private employers at multiple levels can offer superior compensation, better working conditions, and more appealing job characteristics for the same skill sets. No amount of data-driven shift scheduling addresses this fundamental disadvantage in the labor market.

Whether this represents efficient market allocation or systematic failure of public goods provision remains the unanswered question that better overtime tracking will never resolve.

The Social Work Debate

The mental health call crisis has prompted serious discussion about alternative response models, though implementation has been limited.

Eugene, Oregon's CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets) program, established in 1989, dispatches mental health professionals and paramedics to mental health, substance abuse, and welfare check calls instead of police. The program handles approximately 17% of Eugene's 911 calls and costs roughly $2.1 million annually—a fraction of what those calls would cost if handled by police.

CAHOOTS data shows that in 2019, the program responded to 24,000 calls with police backup requested in fewer than 1% of cases, suggesting most mental health calls don't actually require armed officers.

San Diego piloted a limited "Community Response Team" in 2021, pairing a police officer with a mental health clinician for certain calls. The program showed promising results but has not been scaled due to funding constraints and implementation challenges.

"This is exactly the kind of civilianization we should be doing," said Dr. Rodriguez from SDSU. "It addresses officer morale by removing inappropriate work from their plate, reduces overtime costs, improves outcomes for people in crisis, and frees officers for work that actually requires police powers. The fact that it hasn't scaled reveals the political and organizational obstacles to rational system redesign."

The Prosecution Reality

District Attorney Stephan's office provided a written statement acknowledging resource constraints: "Like police departments nationwide, we face staffing challenges and must prioritize cases based on public safety threat, available evidence, and likelihood of successful prosecution. We work closely with law enforcement to communicate filing standards and improve case quality."

The statement noted that San Diego County's conviction rate for prosecuted cases exceeds 85%, suggesting that cases that do get filed have strong outcomes.

But this creates a catch-22 for officers: high conviction rates require selective prosecution, but selective prosecution means many arrests don't lead to charges, creating the perception that arrests are futile.

"The system is optimizing for conviction rate at the expense of deterrence," argued a deputy district attorney who requested anonymity. "When criminals know most property crimes won't be prosecuted, you lose the deterrent effect. Officers are right to feel their work isn't valued when we decline solid cases because we're overwhelmed."

Where the Futility Argument Fails

Critics of the "futility" explanation note that it can serve as post-hoc justification for officers who are actually leaving for more prosaic reasons: better pay elsewhere, retirement, career change, or the housing affordability crisis.

"It's easier to say you're leaving because the job lost meaning than to say you're leaving for a $15,000 raise in Riverside," noted one SDPD command staff member. "Both can be true, but the futility narrative is more professionally flattering."

Additionally, if futility were the primary driver, lateral transfers to other California departments—which face identical prosecution constraints under Proposition 47—wouldn't make sense. Yet many departing SDPD officers take positions in neighboring jurisdictions rather than leaving law enforcement entirely, suggesting compensation and housing affordability remain significant factors.

The Unanswered Question

What remains unresolved is whether the "futility" officers describe reflects:

A legitimate system failure where institutional constraints prevent effective law enforcement, requiring fundamental reform of prosecution practices, mental health systems, and service delivery models
A necessary evolution where traditional enforcement models are appropriately being replaced with approaches that evidence shows work better, requiring officers to adapt their understanding of their role
A morale management problem where better communication about case outcomes, system constraints, and how officer work contributes to public safety could address perception gaps
Some combination of all three, requiring simultaneous reform of systems, evolution of practice, and improved organizational communication

What's clear is that ignoring the morale and purpose dimensions while focusing exclusively on overtime tracking and pay competition addresses only part of the retention crisis.

As one 15-year SDPD veteran preparing to retire early put it: "I love this job when I'm actually doing police work—investigating cases, solving crimes, helping victims. But that's maybe 20% of my time now. The rest is babysitting problems we have no tools to fix, doing paperwork for arrests that go nowhere, and watching the same dysfunction repeat itself daily. I didn't sign up for this, and no amount of overtime pay makes it feel worthwhile."

Whether that perspective represents an occupational identity crisis that law enforcement must navigate, or a valid critique of systemic failures that policymakers must address, remains San Diego's unanswered question—and one that better overtime tracking will never resolve.

Sources:

San Diego Police Officers Association interviews and statements
SDPD operational data (mental health call volume)
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