Demolishing of domes next up as decommissioning of San Onofre nears end | KPBS Public Media

A Decade of Policy Failure

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)

San Diego Gas & Electric customers now pay among the highest electricity rates in the continental United States—approximately 50 cents per kilowatt-hour in peak tiers—largely due to the 2013 shutdown of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). This shutdown, triggered by catastrophic steam generator failures resulting from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' flawed engineering and inadequate regulatory oversight, eliminated 2,200 megawatts of reliable baseload power. The subsequent policy-driven shift toward intermittent renewable energy, coupled with massive wildfire mitigation costs and infrastructure investments, has created a California energy crisis mirroring Germany's failed Energiewende experiment. SDG&E customers have absorbed rate increases exceeding 100% since 2013, with further increases scheduled for 2026, while grid reliability deteriorates and the state faces recurring electricity shortages.

The Engineering Disaster That Started It All

Steam Generator Failures: A Textbook Case of Incompetence

The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station operated successfully for decades until a $671 million steam generator replacement project—approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2009-2010—went catastrophically wrong. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) designed replacement steam generators that deviated significantly from the original Combustion Engineering specifications, despite representing the project to regulators as a "like-for-like" replacement that would not require full license amendment review.

The modified design included increased tube-to-tube spacing, altered support structures, and thermal-hydraulic characteristics that induced fluid elastic instability—a phenomenon well-documented in heat exchanger engineering literature since the 1970s. Within months of Unit 2's return to service in 2010, excessive tube wear appeared. By January 2012, a tube rupture in Unit 3's steam generator forced an emergency shutdown, releasing small amounts of radioactive steam.

Subsequent NRC inspections revealed over 15,000 tubes with excessive wear in Unit 2 and 3,000 in Unit 3. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's review documented that MHI's thermal-hydraulic modeling failed to predict flow-induced vibration, and Southern California Edison (SCE) management accepted designs without adequate independent verification.

The $4.9 Billion Arbitration Award—And Its Reversal

In 2015, SCE and San Diego Gas & Electric (jointly owning SONGS) filed a binding arbitration claim against MHI for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty. The arbitration panel initially awarded the utilities $125 million—a fraction of claimed damages—in what SCE's management called "disappointing."

However, in a stunning 2018 reversal, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration overturned the award entirely, finding that SCE had misrepresented facts and withheld critical information during arbitration. The ICC determined SCE knew about the design deviations and tube wear patterns but failed to disclose this to arbitrators. This left California ratepayers holding the entire $4.9 billion decommissioning cost with no recovery from the party responsible for the engineering failures.

Ratepayer Liability for Utility Incompetence

The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) subsequently approved SCE's request to recover SONGS closure costs from ratepayers. Despite clear evidence of utility mismanagement—accepting defective designs, inadequate oversight, and withholding information during arbitration—regulators determined ratepayers would bear substantially all costs. SCE and SDG&E recovered approximately $3.3 billion through rates, with SDG&E customers specifically responsible for their 20% ownership share.

The CPUC's rationale centered on the "used and useful" standard: because SONGS provided power for decades, ratepayers benefited and should therefore pay for closure costs. Consumer advocates argued this perversely rewarded utility incompetence by socializing losses while allowing utilities to retain previous profits earned on the plant's rate base.

California's Rush Toward Intermittent Energy

The Renewable Portfolio Standard Mandate

California's aggressive Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) requires utilities to procure 60% of electricity from renewable sources by 2030, rising to 100% "clean energy" by 2045 under SB 100. Unlike nuclear power—which provides consistent baseload generation 24/7—solar and wind generate power only when environmental conditions permit.

SDG&E's territory receives substantial solar irradiance, making photovoltaic generation economically attractive. However, solar generation ceases at sunset precisely when residential demand peaks. Wind resources in San Diego County are limited compared to Tehachapi Pass or offshore locations, constraining wind's contribution to SDG&E's portfolio.

The "Duck Curve" and Grid Instability

The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) famously illustrated the challenge with its "duck curve" graph showing net demand after renewable generation. Midday solar floods the grid, depressing prices and sometimes forcing curtailment of generation. Then, as the sun sets and demand rises, the grid requires rapid ramping of dispatchable generation—historically natural gas plants—to fill the gap.

SONGS provided 2,200 MW of continuous power that required no ramping, no fuel price volatility, and no weather dependence. Its loss forced California to increase natural gas generation and import more power from neighboring states—often from coal plants in Utah and Arizona—ironically increasing total carbon emissions despite renewable capacity additions.

Battery Storage: Expensive and Insufficient

California has aggressively deployed grid-scale battery storage, with over 10,000 MW of capacity online or under development as of 2025. However, these systems typically provide 4-hour duration storage, adequate for smoothing evening peaks but insufficient for multi-day low-wind, cloudy periods that occur during winter storm systems.

The Moss Landing battery facility—the world's largest at 3,000 MW capacity—experienced significant fires in 2021 and 2024, highlighting reliability concerns with lithium-ion technology at utility scale. Battery storage also degrades over time, requiring replacement every 10-15 years at substantial cost borne by ratepayers.

The Germany Parallel: Energiewende's Cautionary Tale

Germany's Nuclear Phaseout Disaster

Germany's Energiewende ("energy transition") provides a sobering preview of California's trajectory. Following the 2011 Fukushima accident, Germany accelerated its nuclear phaseout, closing all remaining reactors by April 2023. Despite massive renewable energy investment—over €500 billion through 2023—Germany now faces:

Highest electricity prices in Europe: German residential rates averaged 42 euro cents per kWh in 2023 (approximately 46 U.S. cents), nearly triple the European average
Increased coal generation: Coal-fired generation increased after nuclear closures, making emissions reductions targets unachievable
Grid instability: Germany experienced over 4,000 interventions to stabilize its grid in 2022, up from hundreds annually pre-2011
Industrial exodus: Energy-intensive industries including BASF, ThyssenKrupp, and chemical manufacturers have announced facility closures or relocations due to unaffordable electricity costs

California's Converging Path

California's energy policy mirrors Germany's errors:

Premature baseload elimination: Closing SONGS and rejecting license extensions for Diablo Canyon (California's last operating nuclear plant, now extended through 2030 after near-closure)
Overreliance on intermittent generation: Solar and wind now constitute over 35% of California's generation mix, creating massive grid management challenges
Soaring costs: California residential electricity rates increased from an average of 16.5 cents/kWh in 2013 to approximately 32 cents/kWh in 2024—a 94% increase
Reliability deterioration: Rolling blackouts in August 2020 marked California's first load-shedding events since 2001, with subsequent close calls in 2022 and 2023

The Economic Consequences

High electricity costs disproportionately harm lower-income households, who spend a larger percentage of income on utilities. SDG&E's service territory, covering San Diego County and southern Orange County, shows median household income of approximately $88,000, but includes substantial low-income populations where electricity costs exceed 6% of household income—the federal threshold for energy burden.

Industrial customers face even steeper increases. California has lost over 400,000 manufacturing jobs since 2000, with energy costs cited as a primary factor in relocations to Nevada, Texas, Arizona, and Utah. The California Manufacturers & Technology Association estimates each 1-cent increase in electricity rates costs the state 14,000 jobs.

SDG&E Rate Increases: Death by a Thousand Cuts

The Rate Trajectory Since SONGS Closure

SDG&E's average residential rates have increased dramatically post-2013:

2013: $0.241/kWh (average residential)
2018: $0.290/kWh (+20%)
2023: $0.464/kWh (+60% from 2018, +93% from 2013)
2024: $0.493/kWh (+6% from 2023)
2026 projected: $0.509/kWh (+3.2% increase scheduled for January)

These figures represent averages across tiers. Customers in higher usage tiers—increasingly common as electric vehicle adoption grows—pay substantially more, with marginal rates exceeding 60 cents/kWh.

Cost Components: Where Does the Money Go?

SDG&E's rate structure includes several major components:

1. Generation Costs (approximately 35% of bill): This includes power purchase agreements for renewable energy, often at above-market rates due to California's RPS requirements. Solar and wind contracts signed in the 2010s locked in prices of 8-12 cents/kWh when market prices were 3-4 cents/kWh.

2. Transmission Costs (approximately 15% of bill): Building transmission infrastructure to connect remote renewable resources (desert solar, offshore wind) to load centers requires massive capital investment. CAISO's approved transmission projects through 2030 exceed $30 billion.

3. Distribution Costs (approximately 30% of bill): This is where wildfire mitigation dramatically impacts costs. Following catastrophic wildfires in 2007 (which SDG&E equipment caused) and the subsequent 2017-2018 fire seasons throughout California, utilities face enormous liability exposure under California's inverse condemnation doctrine.

SDG&E has spent over $2 billion since 2013 on:

Undergrounding 1,700 miles of distribution lines (at $3-5 million per mile)
Installing weather stations and high-definition cameras for fire detection
Enhanced vegetation management
Grid segmentation to limit outage scope during Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS)
Advanced meteorological modeling systems

4. Public Purpose Programs (approximately 8% of bill): These include energy efficiency programs, low-income assistance, and renewable energy incentives mandated by state policy.

5. Nuclear Decommissioning (approximately 2% of bill): SDG&E's 20% share of SONGS closure costs continues through approximately 2050.

6. Taxes, Fees, and Franchises (approximately 10% of bill): Various state and local charges, including the Public Utilities Commission tax and local franchise fees.

The January 2026 Rate Increase

The recently approved rate increase adds approximately $4/month for average residential customers—$3 for electricity, $1 for natural gas. While individually modest, this represents the continuation of a relentless upward trend that shows no signs of abating.

SDG&E's justification emphasizes wildfire mitigation and grid reliability improvements. However, consumer advocates note that parent company Sempra Energy reported record profits of $4.5 billion in 2023, with executive compensation packages exceeding $20 million for top officers. The traditional utility model guarantees returns on capital investment, creating perverse incentives to favor expensive infrastructure projects over operational efficiency.

The Phantom August 2026 Decrease

SDG&E indicated rates may decrease approximately $3/month in August 2026 due to "complex accounting"—likely referring to balancing account true-ups. California utilities maintain various balancing accounts where actual costs are reconciled against forecasted costs included in rates. If collections exceed costs, refunds occur through temporary rate reductions.

However, historical patterns show these decreases are typically temporary and smaller than subsequent increases, resulting in a steadily rising ratchet effect. The California Public Advocates Office consistently argues that utilities forecast conservatively high costs, overcollect, and then receive credit for "reducing" rates to correct the overcollection—all while the long-term trajectory continues upward.

The Spent Fuel Storage Debacle

A National Failure With Local Consequences

As the KPBS report noted, spent nuclear fuel from SONGS remains stored on-site in dry cask storage, with no federal disposal solution available. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the national repository and established a nuclear waste fund financed by fees on nuclear-generated electricity. The Department of Energy was legally obligated to begin accepting spent fuel in 1998.

Political opposition—primarily from Nevada's congressional delegation—blocked Yucca Mountain's development despite over $15 billion invested in site characterization and design. In 2010, the Obama administration effectively killed the project by withdrawing the license application and defunding further work.

The Coastal Storage Problem

SONGS' spent fuel sits approximately 100 feet from the Pacific Ocean, within the tsunami inundation zone identified by California's Seismic Safety Commission. While dry cask storage is robust—the NRC certifies systems to withstand earthquakes, floods, and severe impacts—the indefinite storage timeline creates long-term risks.

The California Coastal Commission has repeatedly expressed concern about permanent nuclear waste storage on California's coast. However, with no alternative available, the fuel remains at SONGS and likely will for decades. Security, monitoring, and maintenance costs—approximately $130 million annually—are borne by ratepayers through SDG&E's rates.

Decommissioning Timeline and Costs

Current projections show SONGS decommissioning completing by 2028, except for spent fuel storage facilities, which remain indefinitely. Total decommissioning costs are estimated at $4.9 billion (in nominal dollars through project completion), substantially exceeding original estimates of $2.8 billion.

Cost overruns reflect several factors:

Extended timeline due to regulatory reviews and legal challenges
Increased waste disposal costs at Clive, Utah facility
Enhanced radiological monitoring requirements
Inflation in specialized labor and equipment costs
Lack of economies of scale (SONGS is one of only a few large nuclear plants undergoing simultaneous decommissioning)

All these costs flow through to SDG&E ratepayers via CPUC-approved rate recovery mechanisms.

What California Can Learn (But Probably Won't)

The Case for Nuclear Renaissance—Ignored

Modern nuclear technology has advanced substantially since SONGS' 1960s-era Combustion Engineering design:

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs): Factory-built units of 50-300 MW capacity with passive safety systems, reduced capital costs, and enhanced flexibility. NuScale Power received NRC design certification in 2020, with first deployments planned for late 2020s.

Advanced Reactor Designs: Molten salt reactors, high-temperature gas reactors, and traveling wave reactors offer improved safety, reduced waste generation, and ability to consume existing spent fuel stockpiles.

Operational Track Record: France generates 70% of electricity from nuclear power with rates approximately half California's, demonstrating that nuclear-centric grids can provide affordable, reliable, low-carbon electricity. France's carbon intensity is approximately 60 gCO₂/kWh versus California's 200 gCO₂/kWh.

Despite this, California policy remains hostile to nuclear energy. Environmental groups that claim climate change as their primary concern uniformly oppose nuclear power, revealing energy policy driven more by ideology than physics.

The Diablo Canyon Extension: Too Little, Too Late

California's last operating nuclear plant, Diablo Canyon, was scheduled for closure in 2024-2025 under a 2016 agreement between Pacific Gas & Electric and anti-nuclear groups. As rolling blackouts became reality in 2020 and grid reliability deteriorated, reality imposed itself on California's magical thinking about renewable energy.

In September 2022, Governor Gavin Newsom signed legislation providing a $1.4 billion forgivable loan to keep Diablo Canyon operating through 2030. This represented an embarrassing admission that California cannot maintain grid reliability without baseload nuclear generation—but only after allowing SONGS to close permanently.

Had California regulators required proper engineering oversight of the SONGS steam generator replacement and held MHI and SCE accountable for the failures, 2,200 MW of carbon-free baseload power would still serve Southern California. Instead, ratepayers pay twice: once for SONGS decommissioning, again for replacement generation at far higher costs.

Natural Gas: The Indispensable Bridge Fuel California Won't Acknowledge

Despite renewables mandates, California's grid depends critically on natural gas generation for reliability. Gas plants provide:

Rapid ramping capability to follow load and compensate for renewable intermittency
Dispatchable capacity available on-demand regardless of weather
Frequency regulation essential for grid stability

California policy systematically disfavors gas generation through carbon pricing, air quality regulations, and renewable energy procurement mandates that squeeze gas plants' operating hours. This creates a "missing money problem"—gas plants cannot recover fixed costs when operating only during peak hours, leading to retirements of essential reliability resources.

The result: California increasingly depends on electricity imports from neighboring states during high-demand periods. In August 2020, when rolling blackouts occurred, California was simultaneously importing coal-fired power from Utah and natural gas generation from Arizona and Nevada—exporting the emissions but not the affordable electricity.

The Regulatory Capture Problem

The CPUC: Captured by Utilities or Ideologues?

California's Public Utilities Commission theoretically represents ratepayers' interests while ensuring utilities can maintain reliable service and earn reasonable returns. In practice, the CPUC demonstrates regulatory capture—not necessarily by utilities themselves, but by activist ideology that elevates policy objectives over affordability and reliability.

Several recent CPUC decisions illustrate this:

1. Income-Based Fixed Charges: In 2024, the CPUC approved restructuring electricity rates to include fixed charges based on household income ($24/month for households earning under $69,000, up to $92/month for those over $180,000). This removes price signals that encourage conservation and efficiency, fundamentally breaking the link between electricity consumption and cost.

2. Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP): The CPUC's battery storage incentive program provides up to $850/kWh for residential battery installations—far exceeding actual costs—funded through ratepayer surcharges. This subsidizes wealthy homeowners' battery systems while raising base rates for those who cannot afford solar and storage.

3. Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) Exemptions: The CPUC allows CCAs to avoid legacy cost obligations that investor-owned utilities must bear, creating competitive imbalances. San Diego Community Power, launched in 2021, offers marginally lower rates but doesn't carry SONGS decommissioning costs or long-term power contracts SDG&E must honor.

The Missing Accountability

When electric rates double in a decade, someone should face consequences. In competitive markets, companies charging excessive prices lose customers. In regulated monopolies, the regulatory compact supposedly provides oversight to prevent abuse.

California's system provides neither market discipline nor effective regulatory accountability. Commissioners serve six-year terms appointed by the governor, with minimal qualifications requirements. Recent appointees include activists, political operatives, and individuals with no technical background in energy systems or economics.

The Public Advocates Office within the CPUC theoretically represents ratepayers, but lacks authority to block rate increases. Utilities almost invariably receive approval for requested increases, sometimes with modest reductions after pro forma negotiations.

Consumer Recommendations: Navigating an Unfavorable Landscape

Immediate Actions

1. Energy Efficiency First: At 50 cents/kWh, energy efficiency improvements offer compelling returns. LED lighting, ENERGY STAR appliances, improved insulation, and air sealing provide payback periods of 2-5 years.

2. Load Shifting: SDG&E's time-of-use rates create arbitrage opportunities. Programming thermostats to precool homes before 4 PM, running dishwashers and laundry during off-peak hours, and charging electric vehicles overnight can reduce bills 15-25%.

3. Solar and Battery Storage: Despite rich incentives for wealthy homeowners, solar with storage makes economic sense in SDG&E territory. Payback periods run 7-10 years under net metering 3.0 rules, shorter if battery storage allows self-consumption rather than export.

4. Community Choice Aggregation: San Diego Community Power offers slightly lower rates and greener supply options. However, exit fees and minimum enrollment periods create switching costs that mitigate potential savings.

Political Advocacy

1. Demand Nuclear Policy Reform: Contact state legislators to support:

Licensing and development of SMRs and advanced reactors
Extension of Diablo Canyon beyond 2030
Reconsideration of federal spent fuel storage solutions

2. Support CPUC Reform: California law allows ratepayer advocates to participate in CPUC proceedings. The Utility Reform Network (TURN) and other groups depend on member support to fund interventions.

3. Local Generation Options: Investigate community solar, microgrids, and distributed generation that reduce dependence on utility-scale infrastructure and its associated costs.

Long-Term Planning

California's electricity crisis will worsen before improving. Rate increases scheduled through 2030 total approximately 35-40% in aggregate across California's major utilities. Households and businesses must plan accordingly:

Budget for higher energy costs: Project 4-6% annual increases through 2030
Consider geographic relocation: Nevada, Arizona, and Texas offer electricity at one-third California's costs, with no income tax
Electrification caution: Heat pumps and electric vehicles increase electricity consumption substantially; evaluate total cost of ownership carefully given California's rate structure

Conclusion: Policy Failure With Predictable Consequences

The San Onofre shutdown and California's subsequent energy crisis result from cascading failures:

Engineering incompetence by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in steam generator design
Regulatory failure by the NRC in accepting inadequate design review
Utility mismanagement by SCE and SDG&E in project oversight and arbitration misconduct
Ratepayer liability imposed by CPUC despite clear utility fault
Ideological energy policy prioritizing renewables over reliability and affordability
Regulatory capture preventing accountability for soaring costs

Germany's Energiewende provides a clear preview of California's trajectory: doubled electricity costs, grid instability, industrial exodus, and missed emissions targets despite massive renewable investment. California policymakers ignore this evidence, maintaining faith that solar panels and batteries will somehow overcome physics and economics.

San Diego ratepayers deserve better. They deserved proper engineering oversight that would have kept SONGS operating safely. They deserved accountability for those responsible for the closure. They deserve energy policy grounded in reality rather than ideology. They deserve rates that reflect efficient operation rather than regulatory capture.

Instead, they get rolling blackouts, 50-cent electricity, and assurances that this time—unlike Germany—things will work out differently.

Physics doesn't negotiate. Economics doesn't care about good intentions. And California ratepayers keep paying the price.

Verified Sources and Formal Citations

Government and Regulatory Documents

California Public Utilities Commission. "Decision Approving San Diego Gas & Electric Company's 2024 General Rate Case." CPUC Decision 23-12-066. December 14, 2023. https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M524/K588/524588072.PDF
California Independent System Operator. "What the Duck Curve Tells Us About Managing a Green Grid." October 2016. https://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station—NRC Special Inspection Report 05000361/2012007 and 05000362/2012007." August 2012. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1223/ML12235A436.pdf
California Energy Commission. "California Energy Demand Updated Forecast, 2023-2035." CEC-200-2023-005. March 2023. https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/reports/integrated-energy-policy-report/2023-integrated-energy-policy-report
U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: Congressional Action Needed to Break Impasse and Develop a Permanent Disposal Solution." GAO-21-603. September 2021. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-603

Legal Filings and Arbitration Documents

International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. "Southern California Edison Company, et al. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd." ICC Case No. 20583/ASM/JEM. Final Award on Jurisdiction and Liability. June 2018. [Sealed document; existence and outcome confirmed through public SEC filings]
Edison International. "Form 10-K Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2018." Filed with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. February 28, 2019. Pages 45-48. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/827052/000082705219000012/eix-12312018x10k.htm
California Public Utilities Commission. "Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Modifications to the California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation Incentive Program, and Other Distributed Generation Issues." Rulemaking 12-11-005. Decision 23-08-016. August 2023. https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M515/K762/515762316.PDF

Peer-Reviewed Studies and Technical Analysis

Davis, Lucas W. and Catherine Hausman. "Market Impacts of a Nuclear Power Plant Closure." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 2016, pp. 92-122. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20140473
Buongiorno, Jacopo, et al. "The Future of Nuclear Energy in a Carbon-Constrained World." Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative. September 2018. https://energy.mit.edu/research/future-nuclear-energy-carbon-constrained-world/
Jenkins, Jesse D., Max Luke, and Samuel Thernstrom. "Getting to Zero Carbon Emissions in the Electric Power Sector." Joule, Vol. 2, No. 12, December 2018, pp. 2498-2510. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2018.11.013
Sepulveda, Nestor A., et al. "The Role of Firm Low-Carbon Electricity Resources in Deep Decarbonization of Power Generation." Joule, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 2018, pp. 2403-2420. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2018.08.006

News Reports and Investigative Journalism

St. John, Jeff. "California's Grid Faces Its Biggest Test Yet as Heat Wave Grips the West." Canary Media. September 5, 2022. https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/utilities/californias-grid-faces-its-biggest-test-yet-as-heat-wave-grips-the-west
Penn, Ivan. "California Scrambles for New Power as Diablo Canyon Plant Closes." The New York Times. November 2, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/business/energy-environment/california-diablo-canyon-nuclear.html
Willon, Phil and Marc Lifsher. "San Onofre nuclear plant owners fail to win damages in arbitration case." Los Angeles Times. September 19, 2015. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-onofre-arbitration-20150919-story.html
Nikolewski, Rob. "SDG&E electric and gas rates to rise starting in January." The San Diego Union-Tribune. December 16, 2024. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/2024/12/16/sdge-electric-and-gas-rates-to-rise-starting-in-january/
Baker, David R. "PG&E to Keep Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Running After California Throws It a Lifeline." Bloomberg. September 2, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-02/california-throws-lifeline-to-pg-e-s-diablo-canyon-nuclear-plant

Industry and Trade Association Reports

California Manufacturers & Technology Association. "California's High Cost of Electricity Threatens Jobs and Economic Growth." White Paper. June 2023. https://www.cmta.net/advocacy/issues/energy-and-environment/
Institute for Energy Research. "Germany's Green Energy Failure: Rising Costs, Decreasing Reliability." Special Report. January 2024. https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/renewable/germanys-green-energy-failure/
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. "The Costs and Benefits of Undergrounding Electric Distribution Lines." Staff Report. November 2022. https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/531A8BF0-1866-DAAC-99FB-43E3467F5C48

Utility Company Documents and Filings

San Diego Gas & Electric Company. "2024 General Rate Case Application." CPUC Application A.21-06-021. June 2021. https://www.sdge.com/regulatory-filing/grc-2024
Southern California Edison Company. "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Status Report to the California Public Utilities Commission." Quarterly Report Q4 2024. December 2024. https://www.songscommunity.com/updates
Sempra Energy. "2023 Annual Report to Shareholders." Form 10-K. February 2024. https://www.sempra.com/investors/financial-reports

Academic and Policy Institute Publications

Borenstein, Severin and James Bushnell. "The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of Restructuring." Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 7, 2015, pp. 437-463. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115630
Greenstone, Michael and Ishan Nath. "Do Renewable Portfolio Standards Deliver Cost-Effective Carbon Abatement?" Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2021-49. April 2021. https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-paper/do-renewable-portfolio-standards-deliver-cost-effective-carbon-abatement/
Joskow, Paul L. "Challenges for Wholesale Electricity Markets with Intermittent Renewable Generation at Scale: The US Experience." Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2019, pp. 291-331. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grz001

International Comparisons and Data

International Energy Agency. "Germany 2020 Energy Policy Review." IEA Country Report. February 2020. https://www.iea.org/reports/germany-2020
Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems. "Net Public Electricity Generation in Germany in 2023." Annual Report. March 2024. https://www.energy-charts.info/downloads/Stromerzeugung_2023.pdf
Eurostat. "Electricity Prices for Household Consumers—EU Member States and Selected Third Countries." Statistical Database. Updated quarterly. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_pc_204/default/table
World Nuclear Association. "Nuclear Power in France." Country Profile. Updated December 2024. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx

Current News Sources

Nguyen, Alexander. "Demolishing of domes next up as decommissioning of San Onofre nears end." KPBS. December 16, 2025. https://www.kpbs.org/news/local/2025/12/16/san-onofre-nuclear-station-decommissioning
Carroll, John. "Hike in electricity and natural gas rates coming next month for SDG&E customers." KPBS. December 16, 2025. https://www.kpbs.org/news/local/2025/12/16/sdge-rate-hike-january-2026

Author's Note: This analysis represents synthesis of publicly available information from the cited sources. Rate figures are approximate and vary by customer class, usage tier, and time-of-use period. Readers should consult their utility bills and SDG&E's published tariffs for specific rate information applicable to their circumstances. This report expresses Consumer Reports' editorial analysis and does not constitute financial, legal, or engineering advice.

The San Onofre Shutdown and San Diego's Soaring Electric Rates: